The rapid advancement of our understanding in the fields of human physiology and behavior in recent years has catapulted the potential of biomedical technologies to new heights. Not only has our reliance on their ability to restore health and fight disease increased, so have the outlooks of using such technologies in enhancing the human ability past what was previously possible. Indeed, the intense controversy that surrounds contemporary instances of biomedical enhancement prompts questioning the ethicality of said technologies.
The usage of biomedical enhancement seems, at first, to be quite favorable to employ and yet, its complex nature merits an intense examination of objections. Common objections are those that are similar to Daniel Moseley and Christina Murray’s “Biomedical Technology and the Ethics of Enhancement,” which presents responses to two common categories of objections to enhancement, “Playing God” objections and “Easy Shortcuts” objections and are found in many prominent textbooks including “Technology Ethics: A Philosophical Introduction and Readings.” However, it seems to me that another viable path of objection to enhancement has eluded them. While Moseley and Murray primarily explore objections that relate to problematic motivations behind enhancement and the loss of character or meaning as a result of using enhancement, I propose another avenue for anti-enhancement perspectives that examines the societal repercussions of enhancement (Moseley and Murray 254). In this paper, I will articulate what I have named the “Intrinsically Inequitable System” objection, a set of arguments that invokes the criticism that the use of biomedical enhancements, in its altering of intrinsic human qualities, creates a fundamentally inequitable system and thus is ethically wrong. Though the means of biomedical enhancement are plentiful, in this paper I will limit my attention to enhancements that are permanent, technologies like genetic enhancement which have effects that are long-lasting and difficult to reverse.
What follows is the gist of my argument:
- Societal systems that are based on intrinsic differences and create intrinsically inequitable systems are morally wrong.
- Actions or policies that establish, preserve, or put in place intrinsically inequitable systems are morally wrong.
- Permanent or long-lasting biomedical enhancements such as genetic enhancements alter intrinsic qualities.
- Allowing the widespread usage of permanent biomedical enhancements would put in place an intrinsically inequitable system.
Thus,
- Allowing the widespread usage of permanent biomedical enhancements is morally wrong.
Each of these premises warrants some explanation, but I first begin with a couple of definitions. For enhancement, I believe Moseley and Murray’s definition serves us perfectly well, referring to the use of biomedical technology in the improvement of human capacities beyond what is necessary to restore or sustain health (Moseley and Murray 253). Simply put, the usage of biomedical technologies that attempt to remedy diseases or afflictions that negatively detract from one’s quality of life can be classified as treatments, whereas the usage of biomedical technologies in an attempt to boost ability past what is considered normal in an effort to heighten what is already sufficient is considered enhancement.
Here I will also take the time to draw the distinction between qualities in people that are instrumentally determined and those that are intrinsically determined. By qualities that are instrumentally determined, I mean those that are affected by external factors such as education, training, or socio-economic background. On the other hand, intrinsically determined factors are those that are inherent to the individual, something that is innate to the very person described, whether it be one’s intelligence, physical aptitude, eye color, or other elements that are genetically defined. While I am aware that the line between intrinsic and instrumental qualities can be difficult to ascertain—and some qualities may very well be determined by both, take SAT scores for example, which can be both a reflection of a genetically inherited disposition and socio-economic resources— in this paper I will consider the two of them quite distinct.
The first premise of the Intrinsically Inequitable Systems objection targets specifically societal systems that find their basis in intrinsically determined differences. I argue that these systems create intrinsically inequitable systems, which are morally wrong. Note the particularity of these systems that I deem morally wrong, solely ones that derive from intrinsic differences. Intrinsic differences, when used inequitably as a basis for a societal system, create self-perpetuating and unalterable disparities between individuals, leaving little room for personal effort or societal intervention in bridging these gaps. Take, for example, historic instances of discrimination based on intrinsic qualities like race or gender. In the past, systems such as the institution of slavery that place clear value in one set of intrinsic values as opposed to another have led to profound and long-lasting societal harm. There is no questioning that the system itself is ethically wrong and further, no indication that the troubled past of intrinsically systems will change in the future; they will stay inequitable. Systems deriving from instrumental differences, while also leading to inequalities, are more prone to change and improvement, both on an individual and societal level. These systems, instrumentally inequitable systems, are likely the ones that pro-enhancement advocates might point to as commonly accepted systems in justification of what is really an intrinsically inequitable system. Instrumentally inequitable systems can be found in, for example, the spread and selective access to new technologies or prestigious educational institutions. Though these systems may still lead to initial inequalities, societies have in the past shown the ability to migrate and address instrumental differences through policy and social reform, among other methods.
The essential difference between instrumental and intrinsic differences lies, perhaps, in how the “baseline” of an individual in a system is defined. In an instrumentally determined system the “baseline” remains the same, a person born with access to a computer versus a person born without access to a computer are still on equal grounds, whereas an intrinsically determined system instantly declares one baby to be superior to the other based on some abstraction of certain intrinsic qualities (historic examples include race, gender, yet could also include height, eye color, etc). When these intrinsic qualities are used in the establishment of an inequitable system, it must be morally wrong.
If the first premise is true then the second must be as well. Should it be that the existence of intrinsically inequitable systems is morally wrong, then it follows that anything that permits or facilitates the existence of such systems must also be morally wrong. If we take an intrinsically inequitable system such as the role of women in the 1800s, it seems logical to say laws and norms that permitted or supported the continuation of inequality were also wrong (such as those that forbid their right to vote, own property, or make contracts).
The third premise asserts that the usage of permanent or long-lasting biomedical enhancements such as genetic enhancement alters intrinsic qualities. Relying upon our previous definition of intrinsic qualities, it seems that cases like genetic enhancement fit perfectly into this criterion and not an instrumental quality. The very nature of technologies like genetic enhancement creates a new category of intrinsic difference by imbuing individuals with abilities and traits that are an innate part of them. For example, if a fetus were to be genetically engineered to have specific abilities and traits that it wouldn’t possess without undergoing genetic engineering, it would have undergone a process that has changed its intrinsic values. This now distinguishes it from one that has not been genetically enhanced, even while holding all other environmental (and instrumental) factors fixed.
We’ve established that permanent biomedical enhancements alter intrinsic qualities and further that intrinsically inequitable societal systems are morally wrong, so our examination progresses to determine whether the intrinsic differences stemming from permanent biomedical enhancements would put in place an intrinsically inequitable system. To this I argue yes, it must. Imagine, for a moment, two individuals who are running in a race. Yet, this is not a fair race, for Person A has been genetically engineered to the extent that regardless of all the resources, training, and time that Person B has, it is impossible for Person B to ever match Person A in the race. Allowing permanent biomedical enhancements such as genetic engineering institutionalizes a form of inequality based on biological capabilities, akin to past injustices based on intrinsic characteristics. Rather than advancing society and trickling down, as an instrumentally inequitable system might, the inequity stemming from permanent biomedical enhancements would likely perpetuate and deepen societal divides and create a stratified society where certain individuals are inherently advantaged over others. A single look at history exemplifies the resilience of such intrinsically inequitable systems. Thus, allowing the widespread usage of permanent biomedical enhancements is morally wrong, as it establishes an intrinsically inequitable system that is inherently resistant to efforts aimed at bridging the divide it creates.
Technology Ethics: A Philosophical Introduction and Readings, Edited by Gregory J. Robson and Jonathan Y. Tsou
Tianyi Evans Gu 